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contained in a settlement agreement ... the settlement agreement is recorded
in Bingham county [ and Bonneville county [ and is enforceable by the parties
thereto."
Consequently, the Settlement Agreement cannot define, add, or subtract
from the defining elements of 181C. It can only provide "additional conditions
and limitations" on the exercise of 181C. To allow the Settlement Agreement
to enlarge or otherwise alter the clearly decreed elements of 181C would allow
private parties to alter a judicial decree.
The Court then determined if the circumstances demonstrate mitigation
for 12261 regardless of the elements of 181 C. The City argued that incidental
recharge occurs from the seepage each year at the Jensen reservoir, and therefore, recharge should be an authorized use of 181C without filing a transfer.
However, the Court held that recharge is a statutorily recognized beneficial use
which must be identified under the purpose of use element of a water
right. Water right 181C does not include recharge, and incidental recharge cannot be used to claim or expand that water right. Accordingly, without a transfer
approving recharge as a beneficial use, any seepage that occurs under 181C is
incidental recharge and not eligible to be used for mitigation purposes.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court ruling that the plain
unambiguous language of 181C's purpose of use element does not authorize
the City to use water for recharge and if the City wanted to use 181C as mitigation for 12261 it would have to file a transfer.
Natalie Norcutt
MONTANA

In re Scott Ranch, LLC, 402 P.3d 1207 (Mont 2017) (holding that: (i) water
rights claims were recognized under state law, not as a federally reserved water
right established under the Crow compact; and (ii) the water court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the water rights claims, which should instead be filed with
the Department of Natural Resources and Environment under the exempt
claims filing procedure pursuant to the revised statute).
Scott Ranch is a Montana limited liability company owned by three nonIndian siblings that acquired Indian allotment lands in Big Horn County within
the Crow Indian Reservation ("Crow Reservation") in Montana. The lands
were previously held in trust by the United States for the benefit of Thor Lande,
a member of the Crow Tribe who was an allottee of the Crow Reservation's
federally reserved water right Lande passed away in 1997, and the United
States issued fee patents and converted the lands to fee status in 2006. Scott
Ranch purchased the lands from an heir of Lande in 2010 and 2012.
In July of 2016, Scott Ranch filed for adjudication of existing water rights in
the water court, asserting all of its forty-seven claims were exempt from the filing
requirements of sections 85-2-221 and -222 of the Montana Constitution. Scott
Ranch claimed that its water rights were not available for state adjudication until
2006 when the fee patents were issued, and it filed the petition on the ground
that the recent issuance of fee patents created a unique set of facts that prevented
it or its predecessors-in-interest fron seeking adjudication until now. Scott
Ranch additionally claimed that it possessed " Walton" rights, water rights held
by a non-Indian successor to allotment lands derived from the allottee's share
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of the federally reserved water rights for the reservation, as appurtenances to
the lands.
In November 2016, the water court denied Scott Ranch's petition and held
that the water rights were part of the tribal water right established under the
Crow Compact because Scott Ranch's water rights were appurtenant to an allotment and the allottee's water rights were part of the tribal water right. Consequently, the water court determined that Scott Ranch's water rights did not
require separate adjudication. After Scott Ranch moved for amended judgment
in December 2016 that its Walton rights should be subject to state law, the water
court held that Scott Ranch's water rights did not exist until the ratification of
the Crow Compact in 1999; therefore, Scott Ranch had no separate water rights,
and the allottees could not have conveyed such a separate right. Scott Ranch
appealed.
The Supreme Court of Montana first considered whether Scott Ranch had
"existing" water rights. The Water Use of Act of 1973 ("the Act") defines an
existing water right as a right to use of water that would be protected under the
law as it existed prior to July 1, 1973. All water rights appropriated afterJuly 1,
1973, must submit to a mandatory permitting process administered by the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation ("the Department"). Federal
law mandates that an Indian reservation receives an implied entitlement to the
water rights within its boundaries with the priority date being the date of the
reservation's creation. The Crow Reservation's water rights have a priority date
of 1868; thus, the Crow Tribe's water rights were "existing" prior to the enactment of the Act, which means that Scott Ranch's water rights existed as well.
Next, the Court answered the question of whether Scott Ranch has Walton
rights. Non-Indian successors to Indian allotment lands acquire Walton rights
because the water rights appurtenant to the tribal member's land transfer to a
non-member when the tribal member conveys the land to the non-member.
Scott Ranch is a non-Indian successor-in-interest to allotment lands conveyed
by Lande. Therefore, it possesses Walton rights.
Third, the Court affirmed that Scott Ranch's water rights are governed by
state law. Under the Crow Compact, state law recognizes water rights held by a
non-tribal member that the United States does not hold in trust. Scott Ranch
acquired the water rights from a tribal allottee, not out of the Crow Compact,
and therefore state law governs its rights.
Lastly was the question of whether the water court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Scott Ranch's claims. All claims for existing water rights must have been
filed by July 1, 1996 under section 85-2-221(1) of the Montana Constitution
unless exempted by section 85-2-222. Water rights claims existing before 1973
are exempt.if they are for livestock or individual uses as opposed to municipal
uses, but an amendment to the Act allows claims for exempt water rights to be
filed until June 30, 2019, which must be adjudicated through the required filing
procedures with the Department. Forty-five of Scott Ranch's forty-seven claims
were for livestock or individual uses and were thereby exempt from the filing
deadline. Its other two claims, Scott Ranch argued, were not subject to the
exempt claims requirements even though they were not for livestock or domestic uses. However, the water court may not adjudicate claims of non-exempt
water rights filed afterJuly 1, 1996. Thus, the water court did not have jurisdiction over Scott Ranch's claims and could not hear its petition.
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the water court's judgment denying Scott Ranch's petition and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss
without prejudice so that Scott Ranch may file exempted water rights claims with
the Department using the proper filing procedures under the revised statute.
GianniPuglielli
Danreuther Ranches v. Farmers Coop. Canal Co., 403 P.3d 332 (Mont.
2017) (holding that: (i) Danreuther's statement of claims is presumed valid because proof of precise flicts as to persons' activities over one hundred years ago
is often not possible, even where written records are kept; and (ii) the trial court
erred in finding an implied second water right based on filings by Danreuther's
predecessor in interest in 1880 and 1887 for water rights because the second
filing related back to the date of the first filing).
Danreuther Ranch ("Danreuther") filed claims for irrigation and stockwater
rights from the Teton River. Farmers Cooperative Canal Company ("Canal
Company") objected to the claims. The water court upheld Danreuther's
claims based on a presumption of validity regarding historical filings. However,
the water court found that Danreuther's predecessor in interest had increased
farming acreage from nine to fifty acres, as stated in their 1880 and 1887 filings,
which gave rise to the implication of a second separate water right. The Canal
Company appealed and Danreuther cross-appealed. The Montana Supreme
Court reviewed the appeal for clear error.
The Court first considered whether the water court had committed clear
error in finding Danreuther had inherited various claims. The first claim the
court reviewed stemmed from an 1874 filing by Nelson Vieux ("Vieux"),
Danreuther's predecessor in interest. The court found Vieux's 1874 claim was
sufficient to establish a water right because the contents of a statement of claims
are presumptively true unless overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Court reasoned that proof of precise facts as to specific activities that occurred over 100 years ago is difficult to obtain, even when written records exist.
Courts will presume facts in the record to be true, unless the objector can provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. Otherwise, the
Court reasoned, claimants would be subject to an unjustifiably heavy burden to
prove the existence of their claim.
The Court upheld the presumption of validity of Vieux's 1874 filing. The
Court found that Vieux's various filings, along with the fact that Vieux's irrigated
acreage increased from nine to fifty acres in an area unsuitable for non-irrigated
farming, were sufficient evidence that Vieux was in fact irrigating acreage and
working on perfecting his 1880 claim. Furthermore, the Court found the lack
of actual evidence that Vieux started any ditch construction in 1874 as insufficient to overcome the presumption of validity. The Court affirmed the water
court's ruling and held that the lower court had not committed clear error in
finding Danreuther had a valid claim as an inheritor of Vieux's 1874 filing.
In addition to valid water claims by Vieux, the lower court found that
Danreuther had inherited a second valid claim through a 1914 notice of appropriation filed by his predecessor in interest Helen Hibbard ("Hibbard"). Ap-

